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Belief
An Essay in Understanding
SHUBHA GHOSHt
INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly someone will disagree, but the most
striking statement contained in the founding documents of
the American Republic is "[w]e hold these truths to be self-
evident .. . ." The words that follow have resonated
throughout American history, with their most recent and
memorable invocation by the Reverend Martin Luther King
in 1963. But equally intriguing is the notion that anything
t Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law, Dallas, Texas. I would like to
thank Anshu Pasricha, Editor-in-Chief, for inviting me to contribute an essay to
the third essay issue of the Buffalo Law Review. I apologize in advance to him
and to any readers of this piece for using his gracious invitation as an
opportunity to present the following speculations on a topic that is somewhat
outside my usual area of scholarship. But, what better use of an invited essay
than to explore ideas that are alluring and enticing, which may otherwise find
no justification for expressing? For those seeking a clue on how to classify this
piece, for whatever reason, consider the following exchange:
Indian middle-man (to Author): Sir, if you do not identify your
composition a novel, how then do we itemise it? Sir, the rank and file is
entitled to know.
Author (to Indian middle-man): Sir, I identify it a gesture. Sir, the rank
and file is entitled to know.
Indian middle-man (to Author): Sir, there is no immediate demand for
gestures. There is immediate demand for novels. Sir, we are literary
agents not free agents.
Author (to Indian middle-man): Sir, I identify it a novel. Sir, itemise it
accordingly.
G. V. DESANI, ALL ABOUT H. HATTERR 12 (McPherson & Co. 1986) (1948).
Substitute "essay" for "novel" as appropriate. For those who are comfortable
with more familiar cultural references, try the following: "Persons attempting to
find a motive in this narrative will be prosecuted; persons attempting to find a
moral in it will be banished; persons attempting to find a plot in it will be shot."
MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (New York, Charles L.
Webster and Co. 1885).
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is "self-evident." As academics, as trained lawyers, as
professional skeptics, we may find it difficult to accept
anything as true on its face, as clearly evident and right
without the dissection of reason and analysis. Is anything
really self-evident anymore? Or, are these just words we
repeat ironically?
In 1993, Professor Stephen L. Carter published The
Culture of Disbelief, a major book by a major legal academic
that advocated taking religion seriously.1 Chapter Eleven,
entitled (Dis)Believing in Faith, presented an important
criticism of the elevation of reason over faith in liberal
political thought and a call for recognizing epistemic
diversity and the role of moral thinking in formulating
political and social judgments that connect with one's lived
experience. 2 As a claim that we cannot base judgments on
reason alone, the call for epistemic diversity is an appealing
and assuredly a correct one. Emotions, intuitions, passions,
each inform how we live and how we should structure
society as much as objective evidence. But if unfettered
reason is misguided, so must be unchecked belief. If the
Culture of Disbelief is problematic, as Professor Carter so
convincingly demonstrates, we have to ask what does the
Culture of Belief look like and what dangers does it hold. In
his book, Professor Carter is a very careful critic of religious
fundamentalism in American politics, pointing out that the
problem with religious rhetoric in the Republican
Convention of 1992 was not the invocation of religion, but
the questionable secular ends to which religion was put.3
But in moving away from a Culture of Disbelief, what keeps
us from the dangerous shoals of the Culture of Belief? Only
a careful understanding of belief can help us to avoid those
uncertain currents.
By posing the question "what is belief?" I do not have an
agenda to endorse any particular set of beliefs. My concern
is solely with understanding what we mean when we use
the word "belief' or when we say we believe in X, whatever
X may be. I am distinguishing belief from the concept of
faith, which is a form of belief, but one with different, and
1. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
2. Id. at 213-32.
3. Id. at 49-50.
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perhaps deeper, obligations. 4 More importantly, belief may
not be grounded in religion at all. Instead, it may include
secular commitments, such as a commitment to eradicating
poverty, or toward improving the environment. The
contemporary use of the word "belief' is often a watered
down, perhaps even bastardized, version of the term "self-
evident." While "self-evident" suggests that there are some
claims that no one can dispute because they are so true on
their face, belief implies a subjective system of validation. A
belief is something that an individual holds to be true, for
whatever reason, but most importantly, for a reason that
does not necessarily have to be justified to a non-believer.
That belief is not completely subjective is demonstrated by
the existence of communities of believers-groups of people
who share a set of beliefs that need not be validated to
those outside the group. To believe in this day and age is to
hold some truths to be self-evident to one's own community;
there is no claim beyond those boundaries of social and
personal solidarity.
Belief resonates in many other ways that leads us to
ask what we mean when we use this word. At a recent
conference at which I was presenting on economic theory
and intellectual property, a commentator asked why I did
not solely teach economics in my intellectual property
classes since I "obviously believe[d] in the stuff." The notion
that economics-or any discipline-is something one
believes in, reflects not only how disciplines are viewed in
the law, but also how we do not understand what we mean
by belief. The commentator, I think, was trying to draw a
distinction between claims that one must make a leap to
accept and those that follow solely from common sense. He
was using the word "belief' in the same way we sometimes
refer to a legal zealot as a "True Believer," the title by the
way of a fairly good law movie5 with a fictionalized Tony
Serra played by the actor James Woods.6 A True Believer is
a lawyer who pursues a cause to the bitter end, beyond
what might be sensible, and stands in contrast, I presume,
4. See ELAINE PAGELS, BEYOND BELIEF: THE SECRET GOSPEL OF THOMAS 183-
84 (2003) (distinguishing between faith and belief).
5. TRUE BELIEVER (Columbia Pictures 1989).
6. Woods often portrays wild and wooly characters caught up with their
beliefs. See, e.g., SALVADOR (Helmdale Film Corp. 1986) (his character of a
journalist in the Oliver Stone movie).
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with the more staid, stolid rational attorney, balancing
every cost and benefit, to Justice Holmes' delight.
But does that archetypal staid attorney really not
believe anything, except the virtues of utilitarian
balancing? The Holmesian bad man is a die-hard nihilist,
but is also, thankfully, a fiction. The opposite of the True
Believer is not the technician. We each do believe
something, but differ to the extent that we display our
beliefs and let ourselves be guided solely by them. Dare I
say, it is self-evident that we are all true believers to a
certain degree, and the harder question is understanding
why we believe what we believe and, more importantly,
what we mean when we say we believe something.
Given Holmes' love of economics, it is important to note
that Laurence A. lannaccone, an economist whose
scholarship focuses on the economics of religion, provides
some encouragement for an exploration of the meaning of
the word "belief." "Although beliefs lie at the core of every
religion," he writes, "economists have yet to say much about
the formation of beliefs, religious or otherwise, nor have
they given much attention to the process by which religions
seek to shape people's beliefs and values."7 I do not pretend
to even come close to addressing the full research project
proposed by Professor Iannaccone. Nor do I fully endorse it.
Some fine work in this vein has been carried out fruitfully
by Timur Kuran, an economist who writes on preference
formation and preference falsification.8 But Jannaccone's
proposal did challenge me to think about the question of
belief and how it is used in the domain of law. The
economics of religion, as articulated by Professor
Jannaccone, is a field that seeks to explode two myths: "that
of homo economicus as a cold creature with neither need
nor capacity for piety, and that of homo religiosus as a
benighted throwback to pre-rational times."9 To the extent
that homo economicus has an analogue in jurisprudence,
which often also seeks to banish homo religiosus, I have a
similar goal for understanding the place of belief in law.
7. Laurence R. Iannaccone, Introduction to the Economics of Religion, 36 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1465, 1491 (1998).
8. See, e.g., TIMuR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995).
9. lannaccone, supra note 7, at 1492.
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The inherency of belief, even in an ostensibly
utilitarian world view, is demonstrated by how much our
ordinary day to day, arms-length, self-interest driven
transactions are based on claims that cannot completely be
justified by reason alone. This point was made clear to me
during a law school class in which I was discussing the
economic and legal foundations of money. The particular
focus was on currency that was not backed by a commodity
like gold, the so called "fiat money" because a state
authority has simply designated something to be used as
money. The student, a bright person with, I later learned, a
philosophy background from a fairly strong institution on
the East Coast, stated despondently that the whole
economic system could collapse at any moment because
nothing was holding it together other than what people
believed. Other students seemed to start down that path of
despair as well. I tried to assure them that while such a
catastrophe was possible, it was highly unlikely given the
institutional safeguards in place to keep it from happening.
I am not sure if any of them slept better after my attempts
at consolation, but the point is made. The economic system
does rest on the, perhaps fragile, belief that the system will
work. But the beauty, or so we are told, is that the system
is designed to coordinate these beliefs in self-reinforcing
ways. You believe that the bank teller will in fact deposit
your cash and not run off; that the credit card company will
honor your transactions; that the vendor will provide the
right specifications; that the caterer will arrive on time; and
that the pension fund will be relatively intact when the
time comes. In many of these instances, the force of law
may support your beliefs. But we could then continue to
unpack all the beliefs that underlie the rule of law. The
point, however, is that we are all believers of sorts, but at
the same time, we do not necessarily think the world is just
a charade, or a fantasy. Or perhaps we do, and that is part
of what makes the believing necessary. 10
Whether we understand what we mean by belief or
not, the notion of belief underlies much of what we do and
take for granted-even institutions that we deem to be
10. For an analysis of the relationship between economic and religious
thinking, and the development of the argument that economics is a religion, see




wholly rational and utilitarian. So can we understand what
belief is? I will explore three possible definitions: (1) belief
as a rational justification, (2) belief as an emotional leap,
and (3) belief as an organizing principle. The first two are
unsatisfactory; the third is more helpful. After analyzing
the three definitions, I will discuss what relevance
understanding belief has for how we think about legal
institutions. In reading the following, I hope that the reader
will take my argument as intended: an essay-or
experiment-on ideas that I have been working over in a
relatively rigorous way. Development of the various
arguments will occur, if at all, in future installments as
"articles."
I. BELIEF AND REASON
Pascal's wager provides some insight into the meaning
of belief by posing the question as one of an inexorable
choice that points in favor of God. The God is, without a
doubt, a Christian God, and Pascal presents his wager as
an explanation for Christian faith." "Who," Pascal writes,
"will then blame the Christians for being unable to provide
a rational basis for their belief . . . ?"12 But, Pascal
continues that rationality is not the point-seeking reason
for faith would undermine the very basis of faith. The
question is posed as one of choice. Since one has to live, one
has to make a choice, and so how to choose? The choice, as
framed by Pascal, is simple: "Let us weigh up the gain and
the loss by calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the
two cases: if you win, you win everything; if you lose, you
lose nothing. Wager that he exists then, without
hesitating!"' 3
Pascal distinguishes his argument from one based on
reason, and to the extent that reason means a series of
deductive steps following logically from set principles, his
characterization is correct. Pascal's wager is a persuasive
11. See PETER KREEFT, CHRISTIANITY FOR MODERN PAGANS 12-13 (1993)
(describing Pascal's relevance for modern pagans seeking to understand
Christianity).
12. BLAISE PASCAL, PENStES AND OTHER WRITINGS 153 (Honor Levi trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1670).
13. Id. at 154.
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argument, rather than a logical one, but his persuasion
rests on an appeal to what we would now call
utilitarianism. 14 Pascal appeals to a balancing of the
benefits and costs of belief in God. In his formulation,
believers have everything to gain and very little to lose,
while non-believers face the risk of losing it all. In modern
terms, the wager is a question of expected gains and losses.
If one believes and God does exist, then one gains infinite
salvation. If one believes and God does not exist, then one
loses nothing, except for living a life according to Christian
principles, rather than a hedonistic alternative. If one does
not believe, and God does exist, then one faces infinite
damnation. Since one's best guess is that it is equally likely
that God does or does not exist, then the comparison of the
alternatives of believing and not believing is a comparison
of infinite riches and infinite losses. Therefore, place the
chip on believing.
As utilitarian arguments go, Pascal's wager suffers
from particularly troubling assumptions. Like a game in
Vegas, Pascal's wager is stacked in favor of the house.
When comparing infinite gains and infinite losses, one's
choice is inevitable. Students of mathematics are aware of
the dangers of arguments based on infinity. The
mathematical problem is confounded by the assumption
that it is equally likely that God exists and does not exist. Is
that true? Given the scant evidence in favor of an after life,
ghostly sightings and s6ances as the exceptions, one may
think that it is more likely that God does not exist than
that God does. In such a situation, one needs to know
something more about the relative magnitudes of the
infinite gains and the infinite losses relative to the
probability of God's existence to know whether to bet on
believing. If the infinite loss of damnation is slightly
smaller than the infinite gain of salvation when weighted
by the small probability that God does exist, then one may
choose differently. But even if one accepts that the odds of
God's existence are fifty-fifty, one need still worry that
Pascal's wager could justify any set of beliefs. Pascal frames
the choice in terms of Christian beliefs, but substitute
Christian dogma with other possible belief systems, such
14. See KREEFr, supra note 11, at 291 ("The Wager is not an attempt to
prove that God exists. . . . Rather, it tries to prove that it is eminently
reasonable for anyone to 'bet' on God .... ").
BELIEF2006] 813
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as, for example, a belief that God has chosen the believer to
smite all non-believers. Given the infinite gains from
following God's dictate, Pascal's wager could justify all sorts
of horrors. Furthermore, the belief in question need not be
religious for Pascal's wager to work. Suppose that
conforming to professional or social beliefs leads to
substantial material gain while not conforming leads to
ostracism and great material loss. What would one choose?
Pascal's wager can support betting on Christian beliefs, but
it can also support betting on believing in racial intolerance,
or Social Darwinism, or some other troubling ideology. The
wager does not distinguish between belief and false
consciousness.
Pascal presents his wager as a matter of choice. In
order to live in this world, he assumes that one must choose
whether one believes in God or not. But he presents the
wager in such a way that the choice is illusory. In
presenting us with the choice between infinite gain and
infinite loss, we can choose only one way. Free will is
vanished quickly through Pascal's utilitarian balance.
Perhaps one way to understand Pascal's wager is an
explanation for why belief persists from a cultural
evolutionary perspective. Philosopher Daniel Dennett has
recently proposed that religion can be understood through
the principle of natural selection as applied to cultural
evolution. 15 According to Dennett, religious belief survives
because it provides a strong survival strategy for groups. By
satisfying the need for meaning in one's life, and in the
world, religious belief strengthens group solidarity and
cohesion in contrast to the weak social bonds and
investment in cultural survival among non-believers.
Although he does not mention Pascal, the utilitarian
foundation of the wager provides valuable support for
Dennett's argument. Betting on God dominates betting
against God in terms of maximizing utility. If utility is
understood at the social, rather than the individual level,
Pascal's wager explains why religious belief persists
consistent with Dennett's evolutionary explanation.
Even at the cultural level, Pascal's wager does not
satisfactorily clarify what belief is. The problem is not
15. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, BREAKING THE SPELL: RELIGION AS A NATURAL
PHENOMENON 200-10 (2006) (discussing the meaning of belief).
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simply that Pascal's wager, and Daniel Dennett's theory,
can support almost any belief system that results in infinite
gains, though this is a pretty big flaw. The real problem is
that explanations of belief based on reason justify belief,
whatever belief might be, rather than really provide insight
into what it means to believe something. Falling back on
utilitarianism raises the issue of infinite regress. If I should
believe in God because of the greater utility I or society
gets, why should I believe that greater utility is the goal?
Will the self that survives Death really feel pain and
pleasure as the self that lived? How do we know? Who
should we believe?
Even though Pascal's wager and Daniel Dennett's
evolutionary argument share a common and reinforcing
structure, they, perhaps not too surprisingly, lead in
opposite directions. Pascal wants to make a believer out of
us. Dennett, on the other hand, wants to "break the spell"
that religion has cast on society through its evolutionary
advantage. According to Dennett, religious belief has lived
past its usefulness. The fact that Pascal and Dennett are so
different, despite parallels in their argument, suggests that
there is a flaw in trying to understand belief through reason
alone. As I show in the next section, however, it is equally
flawed to adopt the opposite position and base our
understanding of belief solely on emotion.
II. BELIEF AS A LEAP OF FAITH
When asked to define what we mean when we say we
"believe in something," the natural answer would be that
we find the "something" comforting or intuitively satisfying,
rather than the result of utilitarian analysis. As one author,
in his book on fundamentalist thinking in American
religion and law, states: "Belief, the experience of belief,
always defies description and evaluation, particularly when
it is attributed to others. Indeed, the personal attestation of
belief-'I believe in,' 'I believe that'-obtains much of its
force from its resistance to description and in consequence
our reluctance to evaluate it."16
16. VINCENT CRAPANZANO, SERVING THE WORD: LITERALISM IN AMERICA FROM
THE PULPIT TO THE BENCH 148 (2000).
2006] BELIEF 815
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Christian existentialists, like Soren Kierkegaard, are
often characterized as speaking about a leap of faith.
Admittedly, our notion of what it means to believe
something often does rely on a sense that we are willing to
leap to a certain belief because of its attractiveness. 17 We
may try to unpack these intuitions by appealing to our
upbringing or our social milieu, but all of these variables
are in some sense redundant. They may help in
understanding why we have adopted the particular set of
beliefs that we have, but they do not really add to the basic
notion that we believe in something because of an emotional
or intuitive appeal, rather than a rational choice. I want to
suggest in this section that this conception of belief
grounded in emotion is as troubling as the conception
grounded in reason.
An anecdote illustrates these issues.'8 I attended a
Catholic secondary school, a liberal Catholic one, that still, I
am happy to report, tries to maintain its progressive values.
Like my classmates, I had to take a religion class that, for
the most part, was a combination of ethics and comparative
religious traditions. One of the classes was taught by what I
would describe as a hip cleric, in the fashion of the
progressive, questioning Seventies. During the course, a
classmate, who was fairly devout then, less so now, said
that it was pointless to try to explain what faith is, since
faith is ultimately a mystery. The teacher responded, quite
harshly I remember: "If your faith is a mystery to you, I feel
17. See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY (Reidar Thomte ed. &
trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1980) (1844).
18. I debated whether to include this anecdote because of its
autobiographical elements. One cannot banish one's self from what one writes,
but there is a danger in revealing too much. The main fear I have is what
people will read into the facts presented. For example, it would be easy to read
into the fact that I attended a Catholic school, and that this Essay, therefore,
flows out of the stereotypical Catholic guilt and related neuroses. Walker Percy
and Flannery O'Connor are two great writers who revel in Catholic guilt while
also peeling away its absurdity. But I am not Catholic, in the capital letter
sense, although I have hung out with many, some fitting the stereotype, others
not. I was tempted to bring in other more personal elements that reflect my
agnosticism basted with a heavy syrup of twentieth century Hindu practice and
some Buddhist thinking (largely through a professor in college). I decided not to
go in that direction for the fear of being considered a proselytizer. Hence, the
compromise of this cautionary footnote to not read too much into autobiography
or background. If that warning does not work, let me remind of you of Mark
Twain's words in the "dagger" footnote.
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sorry for you." I recounted this memory to a law and
religion reading group that I was a part of in New York,
and some members of the group were appalled at the
teacher's response. Faith, after all, is a mystery, and the
teacher's attempts at applying reason, in the progressive
Seventies mode, seemed misguided to some of the members
of the reading group. While the teacher perhaps should not
have been as harsh in his tone as he was, he had a point.
Faith, and a fortiori belief, cannot be purely a matter of
mystery. Just like the unexamined life is not worth living,
unexamined belief is not worth endorsing. One has to
understand what one believes, its implications, its origins,
its flaws, and that understanding requires reason as well as
the recognition of mystery.
While it is perhaps true that the unexamined life is not
worth living, it is also the case that the unlived life is not
worth examining. In other words, we need to balance our
analyzing how we live with actual living. The same is true
for belief. If rational scrutiny were applied to every single
one of the beliefs you or I hold, at some point we would each
stop believing and simply start rationalizing. This is
precisely the problem highlighted in the last section. Pascal
himself pointed out that requiring Christians to provide a
reason for their belief contradicted the very concept of faith,
and his wager was intended as a persuasive argument to
support Christian faith.
This response, however, attempts to prove too much. To
say that the unlived life is not worth examining does not
mean that we should live without thinking. Similarly,
believing is not a blind leap. If it were, then it would be
very difficult to distinguish belief from false consciousness,
unless our emotions and intuitions are so finely honed that
we can always be assured of the difference. Reason,
however, needs to intercede to ensure that we understand
what we believe and that our beliefs are not guiding us
astray. Reason is the internal check on our emotions. Or
reason may act through objective third parties that police
our beliefs, from doing harm to ourselves, or to others.
On this point, Professor Carter's advocacy of epistemic
diversity becomes crucial. While Professor Carter was
seeking epistemic alternatives to liberal rationalism, I am
suggesting that epistemic diversity needs to include
multiple perspectives on belief, grounded in intuitions, in
reason, and in psychological hybrids of the two. Instead of
BELIEF2006] 817
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accepting that beliefs are mere leaps, we should be
prepared to question our beliefs and to have them
questioned. By having to explain our beliefs to others and to
have them subjected to scrutiny, we can strengthen our
understanding and appreciation of what we believe and
why we believe it. Therefore, it is unsatisfactory to think of
belief solely as a matter of emotions.
But what about mystery? By subjecting beliefs to the
overpowering force of reason, are we in danger of losing the
emotional resonance that our beliefs supply? I think
mystery need not be sacrificed. As with loving a person,
holding a belief can be strengthened once the flaws are
exposed and examined. The true mystery is why we still
believe what we do, and cherish those we do, even after the
greatest defect has been revealed for us and others to see.
III. BELIEF AS PRINCIPLE
Since belief cannot be understood solely in terms of
reason or emotion, the answer must be in some hybrid of
the two. I suggest that the word "belief' means the
underlying principle or set of principles that guide our
choices. That does not mean we cannot choose our beliefs. It
is not paradoxical to say we choose how we decide to choose,
even though that phrasing does sound a bit confusing. Once
we recognize that believing entails a process of analytical
examination of what we believe combined with the guidance
of the emotional and intuitive appeal of our beliefs, we can
come close to understanding belief as principles that guide
our choices. The problem is that reason and emotion are so
often seen as polar opposites, that we have difficulty in
recognizing how they can co-exist and reinforce each other.
The difficulty of understanding what we mean by belief
stems from the often insurmountable tension, both real and
imagined, between reason and emotion.
Stephen Jay Gould makes an invaluable and compelling
case for reconciling reason and emotion in Rocks of Ages:
Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life, one of the last
books he wrote before succumbing to cancer in 2002.
Professor Gould was a zealous advocate against the various
pseudo-sciences, such as creationism or intelligent design,
which are effectively masked religions. He also sparred
with many evolutionary theorists, such as E.O. Wilson and,
particularly in recent years, Daniel Dennett. I mention this
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because Professor Gould's life-long work demonstrated
acuity both in the scientific and cultural debates raised by
the theory of natural selection. His insight is especially
apparent in Rocks of Ages, where he argues that science
and religion can co-exist in their respective domains, what
he calls "Non-Overlapping Magisteria," abbreviated as
NOMA. 19 Science and religion each have their place,
according to Gould, but they reinforce each other. By
recognizing the ways in which science and religion
complement each other, Gould avoids the potential
problems of dualism posed by NOMA. An excellent example
of how science and religion can co-exist is provided in
Gould's discussion of William Jennings Bryan, the attorney
who prosecuted Scopes in the famous trial.20 While Gould,
obviously, does not endorse Byran's position in the trial, he
corrects the stereotype of Bryan as a reactionary
conservative who adopted a fundamentalist reading of The
Old Testament, contrary to his earlier stance as a political
progressive. As Gould demonstrates, Bryan's response to
Darwinism arose from his concerns with Social Darwinism,
itself a pseudo-science that supported conservative social
policies. Gould's book problematizes the traditional
dichotomy between science and religion and successfully, in
my reading, develops an irenics-a reconciliation-between
the two domains.
The following passage from Professor Gould's book
illustrates how science and religion can be understood
together and provides a nice basis for my position on belief:
What can be more deluding, or even dangerous, than false
comfort that blinds our vision and inspires passivity? If moral
truth lies "out there" in nature, then we need not struggle with our
confusion, or with the varying views of fellow humans in our
diverse world.... But if NOMA holds, and nature remains neutral
(while bursting with relevant information to spice our moral
debates), then we cannot avoid the much harder, but ultimately
liberating, task of looking into the heart of our distinctive selves. 21
19. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, ROCKS OF AGES: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE
FULLNESS OF LIFE 4-5 (1999).
20. See id. at 150-70.
21. Id. at 204.
2006] BELIEF 819
BUFFALO LAWREVIEW
There are two types of passivity that Gould is
challenging in this passage. The first is the passivity of a
certain type of religion that requires us to accept certain
truths about the world without question. The second
passivity is one that comes from science, which reduces
human experience to deterministic, material forces that
take away human choice and free will. Once religion and
science are understood more richly with respect to their
separate, but self-reinforcing, domains, then human life can
be pursued more fully, as we are forced through our hearts
and our heads to better understand the world we live in and
make.
Belief fits squarely within Professor Gould's challenge
to passivity. Belief is not mere justification for how we live.
Nor is belief a blind acceptance of dogma. Instead, when we
say we believe something, whatever the object, we are
adopting a set of principles that guide what we do and who
we are. The concept of belief requires us to recognize that
human agents act both through reason and through
emotions-each acting on the other-in guiding and
shaping behavior. With this analysis of what belief and
believing mean, I turn next to what belief implies for legal
theory and practice.
IV. BELIEF AND LAW
Since this Essay appears in a law review, I should try to
give these ideas some relevance for law. The purported
applications that follow are meant to illustrate some of the
legal questions that lead me to think about the question of
belief and to pursue the topic of this Essay. No grand
doctrinal exegesis is intended or even attempted. To refer
back to the "dagger" footnote, the following are true
gestures.
A. The Uninteresting Constitutional Question
The most obvious question-what does this discussion
of belief say about the constitutional jurisprudence of the
Free Exercise and Establishment clauses-is the least
interesting, at least for me. The jurisprudence of religion, as
I understand it, attempts to solve two problems. First, as
state regulation has expanded to intrude on self-regulation
through private institutions, such as religious ones, and
820 [Vol. 54
through individual conscience, the interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause has attempted to make room for
religious accommodation while pursuing the primary goal of
assimilation of individuals and groups into comprehensive
regulatory schemes. The current law, as articulated in the
decisions of Smith22 and Lukumi,23 does not allow for
religious exceptions from generally applicable and neutral
regulatory schemes but does police regulatory schemes that
target or single out certain religious practices. Second, as
exceptions are created from state regulatory schemes, these
exceptions must be designed so as not to favor or endorse
particular beliefs. Hence, the dialectic of the two clauses
allows the state to create general regulatory schemes that
neither target any particular religious practices nor endorse
any particular religion. This dialectic, of course, is carried
out against a political and legal tradition that is thoroughly
Christian except for some tolerance of minority religions
that can fit into a Catholic or Protestant mold.24
The constitutional questions are uninteresting to me
because much of the debate on religion seems to be settled
within the broad framework I have discussed in the
previous paragraph and is therefore carried out in almost
predictable ways depending upon the interests and
background of the specific debater. One point to consider,
however, is that the question of what we mean by belief
may become of greater importance depending on how
Justice Samuel Alito's views on religion affect the current
22. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
24. This last statement may seem harsh, but reflects the way in which
Supreme Court opinions attempt to fit non-Christian religions into the
Christian mold. Justice Kennedy's description of Santeria, as some offshoot of
Catholicism, in Lukumi is an example of this disconcerting trend. See Lukumi,
508 U.S. 520. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal is an important counterexample. 126 S.
Ct. 1211 (2006). In that case, the Court recognized the claim under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) of a religious group that
attempted to bring into the country hoasca, a hallucinogenic tea prohibited by
the Controlled Substances Act, for religious uses. Id. The Court rejected the
Government's argument that uniform application of federal law was a
compelling interest to burden religion. Id. The opinion, noteworthy for its
treatment of an "oddball" religion, does not discuss belief, and rests largely on
the statutory language of RFRA. Id.
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balance of the Court. Justice Alito, to my mind, takes a tack
that is quite different from Justice Scalia, who advocates
interpreting the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
weakly. Justice Alito, on the other hand, has shown as a
circuit court judge a greater willingness to protect
individual beliefs through the Free Exercise Clause.
In Blackhawk,25 a Lakota Indian named Dennis
Blackhawk sought an exemption from a permit fee imposed
by the Pennsylvania Game Commission for possession of
two black bear cubs that he used in religious ceremonies on
his property. Judge Alito begins his unanimous opinion
upholding Blackhawk's Free Exercise claim by telling us
that "Lakota Indians believe that black bears protect the
Earth, sanctify religious ceremonies, and imbue worshipers
with spiritual strength."26 It is against this description of
the appellant's beliefs that Judge Alito addresses the
Commonwealth's denial of Blackhawk's exemption from the
fee on Free Exercise grounds. Although the issue on appeal
was solely that of the exemption from the fee, Blackhawk
also challenged the Commonwealth's attempt to destroy the
bears because they bit one of Blackhawk's neighbors. The
district court enjoined the Commonwealth from destroying
the bears and ordered their return to Blackhawk. Although
the issue of the destruction of the bears was not on appeal,
it is worth noting for my discussion of Native American
sacred property claims that I discuss below.
The Commonwealth's argument relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith that a neutral and
generally applicable law that burdens religious conduct is
reviewed on a rational basis. The Commonwealth
emphasized the permitted regulation exceptions based on
"hardship or extraordinary circumstance[s] . . . so long as
the waiver is consistent with sound game or wildlife
management .... -27 Blackhawk did not qualify for this or
the exceptions for zoos and nationally recognized circuses.
The Third Circuit rejected the application of Smith, finding
the regulatory scheme to be neither neutral nor generally
applicable since the statute included "both individualized
and categorical secular exemptions" that triggered strict
25. Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004).
26. Id. at 204.
27. Id. at 205 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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scrutiny. 28 The secular exemptions for zoos and circuses
undermined the interests served by the statute to the same
extent as an exemption for Blackhawk. Furthermore, the
Third Circuit found that the individualized exemptions for
hardship and extraordinary circumstances were similar to
the exemptions in the unemployment compensation cases,
in which the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny for Free
Exercise claims. For these reasons, the Third Circuit
required the Commonwealth's denial of an exemption to
Blackhawk to "advance interests of the highest order" and
to "be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests." 29
In its ruling against the Commonwealth, Judge Alito's
opinion emphasized that Blackhawk sought an exemption
"because of his Native American beliefs and because the fee
would cause [him] hardship."30 Nonetheless, he points out,
"the Commission concluded that 'Blackhawk would not be
entitled to an exemption regardless of his financial
circumstances.'' 31 The judge is concerned that Blackhawk's
exemption for religious reasons is as compelling as the
exemptions expressly provided for secular purposes. The
effect of the Commonwealth's ruling against Blackhawk is
to infringe on his religious practices, and consequently the
denial of the exemption does not survive strict scrutiny.
Judge Alito's opinion demonstrates a sensitivity to
religious beliefs and practices, specifically non-Christian
beliefs and practices, that is sometimes lacking in Supreme
Court Free Exercise cases. In Lyng,32 a case decided shortly
before Smith, the Supreme Court held that the federal
government could build a road through a forest that was
held to be sacred by Yorok, Karok, and Talowa Tribes.
According to the majority, while the Free Exercise Clause
prevented the government from discriminating against
religions, it did not prevent the government from making
use of its own property in a way that interfered with the
Tribes' use. Although it would be speculative to guess how
Judge Alito would have ruled in the case, and there are
28. Id. at 209, 212.
29. Id. at 213 (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 212 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
31. Id. (emphasis in original).
32. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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good reasons to think that he would have voted with the
majority rather than the three dissenters (Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun), his opinion in
Blackhawk acknowledges the believer's claim, especially
when juxtaposed against secular justifications for the
regulation. The extensive analysis of alternatives to the
regulatory scheme-such as higher fees for secular uses like
the zoo or circuses-demonstrates a willingness to
accommodate religious beliefs and to question the
neutrality and general applicability of law. Consequently,
the approach to claims of religious belief developed by
Judge Alito may signal a challenge to the current orthodoxy
as Free Exercise cases come before the Court that now
includes Justice Alito.
B. Recognizing Aesthetics in the Marketplace
A theme of this Essay is that the concept of belief
includes not only what is traditionally considered religious
belief, but also includes beliefs that may not be grounded in
religious faith. My contention is that we all have beliefs,
even those who claim to act solely on analysis or reason
alone. For example, a professed belief to help the poor may
be based on religious faith, but may also be based on purely
secular desire to improve the lot of the indigent and
furthermore this desire may not be the result of purely
rational analysis. Recognizing that beliefs may be secular
and that utilitarian and material world views often
entertain unquestioned beliefs helps in framing legal
problems in terms larger than that of interests and
balancing of benefits and costs. The example I would like to
consider is from copyright law.
In Campbell,33 the Supreme Court considered whether
a parody of Roy Orbison's country and western song, Pretty
Woman, made without permission by Two Live Crew, a rap
group, was fair use under copyright law. The Court ruled
that in determining whether the use was fair, a court had to
engage in a multi-factor balancing test rather than make a
categorical determination. Central to the inquiry was the
likelihood of whether the copyright owner would license the
work in question if asked. If there were impediments to
33. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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licensing, then the use would more likely be found fair.
These impediments could include the insurmountable costs
of negotiating a license, like an instructor wanting to
photocopy copyrighted educational materials discovered
shortly before the start of her class. Impediments could also
include psychological costs. If someone, for example, wanted
to use my copyrighted work to launch a scathing critique of
the arguments in my work, I would, understandably, be
quite hesitant in licensing such a critique. Therefore,
criticism, including parody, garners close protection for fair
use purposes and is more likely to be protected from
copyright infringement liability than other uses that may
be more likely to be licensed (such as a movie version of a
work).
The interesting question is the role belief implicitly
plays in the analysis of fair use. Two Live Crew's song is so
diametrically opposed to Roy Orbison's romantic vision of
womanhood that it is not hard to see why the copyright
owner would be recalcitrant in licensing the rights to make
the song at issue in Campbell. Assume that Roy Orbison is
a staunch Democrat (I do not know anything about his
politics and this is just an assumption for the sake of
argument) and the Republican National Committee (RNC)
wanted to use his song to make a pro-Republican ditty.
Unless the proposed song was a criticism of Roy Orbison's
work, as opposed to a pean to the Republican party, the
RNC's use is most likely not going to be determined a fair
use. In other words, it is more likely that a proposed use of
copyrighted work is deemed fair if the use is a criticism of
the work than if it is a criticism of something else. Why is
that and what does the distinction have to do with belief?
One explanation for the difference is that a criticism of
a work will undoubtedly require a citation of specific,
copyrighted portions of the work and therefore such copying
is necessary and serves its own creative purpose. This may
equally be true if the criticism is not of the work, but is
using the work in an ironic way. Consider the case of using
the song "Happiness is a Warm Gun" in a campaign for
firearm regulation. The use is not a criticism of the song
since Lennon and McCartney did not view the song as pro-
gun. Instead, the use of the song itself highlights the
critical commentary and advocacy in favor of firearm




The more coherent explanation is the one described
above as psychological. We are less willing to countenance
criticism of ourselves even if there is money to be made.
Therefore, works that use copyrighted materials to criticize
the materials themselves-a self-referential use of
copyright-weighs strongly in favor of fair use because such
use would most likely not otherwise be licensed. This
explanation, however, does not work for the purported song
by the RNC in the Roy Orbison example above. In this
example, as with the self-referential use, the copyright
owner is unlikely to license the use that criticizes his own
cherished beliefs even though there might be quite a bit of
money to be made. Why then does the psychological
explanation not support finding fair use for the RNC?
I propose that fair use for criticism permits challenges
to beliefs that are expressed openly and publicly in a
particular copyrighted work, but does not permit challenges
to beliefs that may be more private. Roy Orbison's song
captures certain beliefs about women and romance more
broadly. Whether Roy Orbison believes them or not is
irrelevant. What matters is that the work captures those
beliefs as penned by the author. Criticisms of these beliefs,
whosoever they may belong to, are permissible fair use.
However, we do allow the copyright owner to deny licensing
of works that may challenge beliefs that are not made
public in the copyrighted expression. Put another way, by
creating a work, the author makes public certain beliefs
that can be subjected to criticism and challenge, but does
not open himself to criticism on all fronts, including beliefs
that are privately held and not openly expressed.
This distinction is consistent with the notion that
copyright supports the broad marketplace of ideas. The
distinction allows the copyright owner to define the scope
within which his beliefs can be challenged and also define
what is off limits by not expressing certain beliefs in her
work. Therefore, Margaret Mitchell's depiction of the South
is fair game, including all the depictions of race and gender
relations in Gone With The Wind that became the subject of
criticism in Alice Randall's The Wind Done Gone.34
However, Dr. Seuss did not open up his work to be used as
34. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir.
2001).
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a critique of the O.J. Simpson trial, the subject of the
infringing book The Cat Not in the Hat.35 Having not
expressed any beliefs about O.J. Simpson in The Cat in the
Hat, the book's expression is not fair game for critical
commentary on the trial. Beliefs are protected, particularly
the possible false attribution of beliefs, while still
permitting the open exchange of critical commentary on
beliefs that are expressed and made public.
The copyright example shows how the concept of belief
has implications beyond the intersection of religion and
law. The example also shows how aesthetic notions
intersect with commercial ones. Copyright law, in its
incarnation in the United States, is deemed to be about the
commercial exploitation of works. The metric of copyright
protection and of fair use is the common one of commercial
benefit either for the author or the public. Identifying the
role of belief in determining when a use is fair highlights
that aesthetic considerations also play a role in copyright.
The law does not sacrifice personal beliefs for commercial
lucre or transform individual ideas into commodities.
Instead, copyright law permits the individual articulation of
belief, its criticism, and the protection of a core of beliefs
that the copyright owner can exclude from the public
domain, forcing the challenger to publicly articulate his own
beliefs through original expression. Copyright facilitates
not only the literal marketplace of ideas but also the
articulation and exchange of personal beliefs in the public
sphere.
C. Belief and the Legal Mind
The concept of belief provides not only doctrinal play in
sorting through legal cases and conundrums but also
possibilities for expanding our understanding of the legal
mind. There is of course no longer one legal mind, the unity
having been appropriately eroded away by the entrance of
myriad disciplinary and personal perspectives into legal
theory. Professor Anthony Kronman wrote over a decade
ago about the "lost lawyer," the withering away of the ideal
of the lawyer statesman and its replacement with the image
35. See Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d
1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
2006] BELIEF 827
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of the lawyer as a tool of powerful interests (if you are a
certain type of crit) or as a technician seeking efficient rules
(if you are a certain type of law and economics thinker).36
This anxiety over the role of the lawyer, and of the legal
mind more broadly, as articulated by Kronman, has not
changed substantively from the vision painted by Jerome
Frank, who in 1930 wrote that "[t]he lay attitude towards
lawyers is a compound of contradictions, a mingling of
respect and derision."37 The perception of lawyers as highly
respected hucksters, tricksters, and quibblers with
dignity-as reported by Frank-has arguably affected how
the profession views itself.
Frank diagnoses the mixed perception of lawyers as
stemming from the myth of law, the belief that law can
provide definite and certain answers to social problems. He
traces this belief to several primitive human needs,
particularly the need for an authoritarian father figure that
provides meaning to an often absurd, unpredictable world.38
This need has many roots and parallels, including the
consoling influence of religion and religious institutions,
which often are in deep and understandable rivalry with
legal institutions. Looking to law for certainty, however,
leads to inevitable disappointment as the constructs of law
can often do little to stave off the chaos of reality. Hence,
disappointment with law and lawyers inexorably follows as
they fail to satisfy the fantasy.
The quest for certainty in law needs to reconcile itself
with reality. For Frank, the key figure of his age who
demonstrated this reconciliation was Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, someone who Frank-with completely
unselfconscious irony-presents as a substitute father
figure of sorts.39 Frank expressed great respect for Holmes'
ability to be grounded in reality as he worked through legal
problems in light of traditions and accepted principles of
the profession. Holmes' realism informs contemporary
formulations of the legal mind. As a practical matter, law is
largely recognized now as a trade, and not a substitute for
36. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 165-271 (1993).
37. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 3 (Brentano's 1930).
38. See id. at 13-21.
39. See id. at 253-60.
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religion or the path to certainty. The ambiguities of the law
are recognized, perhaps even celebrated, as opportunities
for legal craftsmanship or employment. To the extent that
law is looked upon with suspicion, or even with disdain, the
source is not a betrayal of the promise of certainty but
doubts as to whether lawyers or judges are worth their
price when they deliver a result that works against our
interest or seems to go against our principles. Law is
instrumental as a means to satisfy ends which are devised
elsewhere. These means might include artful legal
persuasion or they may simply be the means to make a
comfortable living and perhaps even to secure enough
resources so that we can leave the practice and pursue
loftier goals. The legal mind in this day and age is
assuredly a practical one, hell-bent on getting the job done,
whatever that job might be.
I paint perhaps too grim a picture of the legal
profession, but the portrayal is designed to contrast with
Frank's depiction of the legal mind fraught with
disappointment and sulking at the neglectful father. Once
law is recognized as instrumental, disappointment is an
inappropriate response. Instead, the unhappy response to
law today reflects the difficulties of dealing with mundane
reality, the need to make a living, to go through yet another
day of drudgery. When the quest for absolutism fails, the
vacuum is filled either by anarchy-where anything and
everything goes-or by a begrudging acceptance of one's
place in the world. The contemporary legal mind often goes
in one direction or the other. On one hand, the need to
believe something may lead one to believe anything, and
flirtations with various ideologies-both on the left and the
right-illustrate this tendency. On the other hand, if law is
purely an instrument, what better ends to point that
instrument than the accumulation of wealth and pleasure?
The windmill is just a windmill and never was or will be
anything else, so continue to grind away.
There is no doubt that the search for certainty in law,
as diagnosed by Frank, represents a form of infantilism.
And it is usually the case that what follows infancy is the
wild abandon of adolescence with the unquestioned notion
that anything and everything goes. I suppose that once the
hormones of adolescence stop raging, we settle into an adult
tranquility where we live life as mundanely as possible.
Perhaps the legal profession has followed this path since
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Frank was writing in the 1930's. But if this is correct, is
this how things have to be? A better understanding of belief
can perhaps push law from its quiescence and inspire the
idealism that seems to have been betrayed. Once belief is
seen as a set of principles that guide who we are, engaged
in a dialectic between reason and intuition, the possibility
exists for translating the notion of belief into the practice of
law. Being a true believer does not mean being a zealot. Nor
does it entail sacrificing the pragmatic comforts of law for
Don Quixotism. Instead, once we recognize that some
notion of belief underlies all our actions, even ones that are
deemed purely utilitarian, then law can be seen as more
than just an instrument, and we can engage in our teaching
and our writing to address the question of which beliefs
matter and which do not, and how the pursuit of those
beliefs can guide how we construct legal institutions.
I am inspired on this last point by Professor Carter's
call for epistemic diversity. The question of belief is not
simply a question of how we know something to be true.
Rather, it is a question of what convictions we are willing to
pursue combined with the practical problem of how best to
pursue them. Belief, both rational and intuitive, is what
guides us and gives us some degree of meaning and sense of
control in our lives. To understand what it means to believe
is to accommodate ourselves to the facts of the world,
markets, governments, and to beliefs that are radically
opposed and alien to our own. Neither the quest for
certainty nor the descent into anarchy, the study of belief
can revivify our existence and transform the otherwise inert
instrument of law into a tool for social construction and
change.
PARTING THOUGHTS
It is perhaps a quaint notion that anything is self-
evident. But despite the quaintness, it is undoubtedly true
that we do have beliefs-either religious or secular
convictions-that guide and bind us to the obligations of
this world. This Essay tries to make the existence of beliefs
apparent while asking what it means to believe something.
There is much to be said about belief beyond the brief
applications here to religious toleration, the marketplace of
ideas, and the legal mind. Whether or not anyone finds
anything I have said credible, or even self-evident, I hope
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that a more careful examination of particular beliefs as well
as the phenomenon of believing is sparked by this
experiment. Otherwise, I fear what comes after the
quiescence of the adult legal mind and the lapse into a
fundamentalist conviction that we know what we know, as
held by each of us as we go through our days or by our
leaders as they continue down the present path.

